Public administration as an academic discipline

Based upon Module 3 readings, articulate the meaning of public administration as an academic discipline and practice in regards to providing public services. Additionally, discuss and analyze the academic development and practice of American public administration.

Your initial response to this discussion should be at least 500 words in length. Be careful to cite sources appropriately.


A related question as to whether public administration is based on fact, value, or characterized by art or science is, Does public administration have a paradigm? Public administrationists have similarly grappled with this issue, at least since Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) classic The Structure of Scientific

. The term “paradigm” had heretofore largely been used in certain forms of linguistics. ForRevolutions example, it was applied to the various patterns one learned to sort or conjugate verbs. Thus in the Italian language, a paradigm for the (irregular) verb “to be” or “essere” is

Beginning in the 1960s the term “paradigm” was used in science in the very broad or universal sense to refer to a theoretical framework. The 1975 Nobel laureate in medicine, David Baltimore, cited the work of two colleagues that “really established a new paradigm for our understanding of the causation of cancer” ( 2005, 341). But it was Thomas Kuhn who in 1962 created a stir aboutAmerican Heritage Guide the existence of paradigms in scientific communities, seeking to provide a more particularized conceptualization of the term. Because public administration had been seen by many as a community of “science,” à la Herbert Simon and other behaviorists, the question of public administration’s paradigmatic basis was launched.

This chapter begins with a cursory review of Kuhn’s . It thenThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions follows with a discussion of the various commentaries by public administrationists on the existence of a paradigm, or the lack thereof. Because Kuhn conceptualized paradigms in the context of the hard or physical sciences, other accounts of the inability of public administration to achieve paradigmatic status are presented, including the applied nature of the field. The chapter examines the question of whether public administration can ever be studied as a normal science—for example, in the Kuhnian context—or if it is better classified as a postnormal science.

KUHN, PARADIGMS, AND NORMAL SCIENCE When Thomas Kuhn was a graduate student studying physics at Harvard University, he began to probe the history of science as he was teaching an undergraduate course. In his studies, he stumbled upon the conundrum of the marked disparities between Aristotelian and Newtonian physics. Why, he wondered, were the two models, both based in the natural science of physics, at complete odds with one another? He concluded that Newtonian physics could not have emerged in any conceivable way from Aristotelian physics—so there must have been a revolution in thinking (Crotty 1998, 34).

This experience led to the primary thesis of Kuhn’s book: Science progresses through cycles, evolving not gradually and cumulatively toward truth, but through periodic, radical revolutions or paradigm shifts. Although Kuhn used the term “paradigm” in twenty-one distinct senses, a distillation of his usages suggests that a paradigm is the model that governs scientific inquiry in a discipline at any given time.1 There is a shared commitment to such a paradigm among the members of the scientific community, which is bound to its discipline by mutual beliefs concerning theoretical constructs, epistemology, and methodologies. Thus, according to Kuhn, a paradigm is essential to scientific inquiry and progress.

During a period of “normal science” scholars or scientists engage in the routine task of “puzzle

C o p y r i g h t 2 0 1 0 . G e o r g e t o w n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s .

A l l r i g h t s r e s e r v e d . M a y n o t b e r e p r o d u c e d i n a n y f o r m w i t h o u t p e r m i s s i o n f r o m t h e p u b l i s h e r , e x c e p t f a i r u s e s p e r m i t t e d u n d e r U . S . o r a p p l i c a b l e c o p y r i g h t l a w .

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solving” or scientific inquiry; they are governed by their existing paradigm. A scientific revolution occurs when scientists encounter anomalies that cannot be explained by the universally accepted paradigm that has heretofore guided their scientific inquiries. There is a “recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science” (Kuhn 1996, 52–53). The period of normal science is replaced by a scientific revolution, thus producing a shift in the commitment to shared assumptions—that is, to the paradigm itself.

For Kuhn a mature science develops through successive transitions from one paradigm to another through this process of revolutions. Once a revolution has occurred and the paradigm has shifted, the field is once again returned to the period or cycle of normal science until another anomaly and then revolution occur.

Kuhn offers several examples of this process, including that of scientific revolutions in physics. He explains that the early science of physics was governed by various theories or laws advanced by Aristotle in the fourth century . Aristotle’s theory of gravity, for example, held that all bodies move toward theirBC natural place, either the Earth or the heavens. So any object thrown into the air would always return to the ground. This was the governing paradigm during the period of normal science. A scientific revolution occurred when Newton advanced his universal law of gravity, which provided a mathematical formula for gravitational force; it established that the force that causes an apple to fall back to the Earth is the same as that which keeps planets in their orbits. According to Aristotelian thought, the planets were believed to remain in their orbits as a result of divine intervention. Thus a new paradigmatic basis for gravitational force replaced the paradigm under which Aristotelian scientific inquiry was conducted. Another scientific revolution occurred with Einstein’s theory of general relativity, which superseded Newtonian law.2

Kuhn concludes that scientific communities are often reluctant and resistant to change, where the old ways of “doing” are replaced with new ways. However, as he argues, change is necessary in that it represents scientific progress in any given field or discipline. For a scientific community to embrace change, Kuhn (1996, 169) argues that two conditions must be met: “First, the new candidate [for paradigm] must seem to resolve some outstanding and generally recognized problem that can be met in no other way. Second, the new paradigm must promise to preserve a relatively large part of the concrete problem-solving ability that has accrued to science through its predecessors.”

DOES PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION HAVE A PARADIGM? If we think of paradigms in a broad sense—as models, worldviews, bodies of thought, or even, as Kuhn (1996, 10) propounded, as that which “attract(s) an enduring group of adherents”—then a paradigmatic base guides public administration. Moreover, most would agree that other attributes of a paradigm, from a Kuhnian perspective, apply to public administration. For example, public administration has specialized journals, professional societies or specialized groups, discussion groups and listservs, and its own place in the academy.3

Lan and Anders (2000, 162) make the case that public administration does have a paradigm, because there is “a set of tacitly agreed-upon paradigms that guide public administration research. The foremost governing paradigm is publicness,” a dimension or quality developed by Bozeman (1987), which is aimed at determining the degree to which “public authority” affects or influences organizations; the concept is intended to help distinguish public from private organizations. Lan and Anders (2000, 155, 162) argue that this paradigm “asserts that public administration differs from other types of management, private management in particular, in meaningful ways…. Under this umbrella, a set of subparadigms (approaches) are competing with one another in guiding the inquiries of researchers. Insofar as paradigms have profound conditioning influences on what scholars think, an important step in advancing the conduct of inquiry in public administration is to become conscious of these underlying paradigms that govern knowledge development and research in the field.”

Others have tacitly accepted this casual definition of paradigm without questioning its relevancy from a research or “scientific” perspective. For example, in a leading public administration textbook, Public

, Nicholas Henry (2006) refers to “paradigms” of public administrationAdministration and Public Affairs as the various intellectual periods defining the field’s development. For example, the “orthodox” paradigm refers to the dominance of scientific management and the discipline’s preoccupation with

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discovering principles of administration that would ensure efficiency, effectiveness, and economy in government operations.

Most recently Lynn (2001) and a number of others have also relied on the term “paradigm” more casually to question whether a paradigmatic shift from the traditional or “Weberian” bureaucracy to “new public management” has occurred. Some use the term “paradigm” to represent theoretical lenses that4 share various approaches to inquiry (Yang, Zhang, and Holzer 2008).

However, Rommel and Christiaens (2006, 610) go so far as to say that public administrationists have complacently bandied the term “paradigm” about in a reckless, illogical manner. They maintain that “traditional scholars … use the paradigm concept too loosely, thereby only leading to heated scholarly discussions and ‘paradigm wars’ but not resulting in practical or useful answers.” They essentially argue: How can there be a paradigmatic shift, when no paradigm existed in the first place?

In a very strict sense, especially Kuhnian, most would concur that public administration lacks a governing paradigmatic base. Rainey (1994, 41, 48), for example, argues that “we have no paradigm,” but he goes on to say that “there is a degree of consensus … on the validity and value of a focus on the public sector as a domain of inquiry.” From a pure science perspective, we do not and cannot have a paradigmatic base, as Rainey aptly points out.

Other factors also help explain why public administration lacks a paradigm. For example, public administration is an applied field. Public administration is concerned with applying scientific knowledge to solve practical problems in highly politicized environments. The real world of government and nonprofits is our laboratory; we do not bring subjects or specimens into a lab as the physical sciences do. Most of our research is conducted in the “field,” and it is aimed at improving government or, more specifically, arriving at a better understanding of it so we can seek to improve governing operations in this country and beyond. But because politics drives performance in public agencies, our understanding of government and how it operates in practice are in a constant state of flux.

Moreover, public-sector environments are driven by multiple, politically driven norms. For example, governments must work to manage the public’s tax dollars in an efficient and economical manner. However, they are regulated by legal mandates that invariably affect their behaviors and actions, which may ultimately lead to inefficient outcomes (see Rosen-bloom 1983a, 1983b). Which values are or should be dominant? Managerial or legal? Efficiency or the legal and constitutional rights of the bureaucracy’s workers or clients? As Moynihan (2009, 820) points out: “The juggling of multiple values makes the lives of both administrative practitioners and scholars more complex. It may have limited the capacity of scholarship to define and build on core doctrinal beliefs in the way that economics has. But all social science disciplines, including economics, have become more fragmented over time. The reactive nature of public administration also creates a danger of ceaseless pursuit of the latest fashions…. But strip away the faddish language of many reforms, and we see a remarkable continuity in terms of their underlying values.”

In practice, then, there cannot be a single, dominant value or norm. In effect, the task of public administration will always revolve around practical applications of solving problems in the real world, which is highly political, fragmented, and transitory.

Another reason why public administration is not able to achieve paradigmatic status is related to its multidisciplinary nature. It draws from a host of fields or disciplines, such as political science, law, business, sociology, and economics. Although public administration is inexorably integrated by these recognizable parts, its multidisciplinary nature, as Waldo (1980, 61) maintains, prevents it from developing an “indisputable paradigm and an agreed methodology.”

Notwithstanding, as a community of scholars, we do not like to admit that the field is not capable of achieving a paradigm, because that admission might serve to marginalize or lessen public administration as a discipline or scholarly endeavor. Indeed, as Kuhn makes clear in one of his many usages of the construct, paradigms help scientific communities to bind their discipline; pre-paradigmatic disciplines, he purports, are “immature sciences.” Thus public administration has sought to identify or formulate—albeit futilely—a governing paradigmatic base.

Kuhn (1996, 161, emphasis added) also argued that questions about whether a field or discipline is a paradigm-driven science “will cease to be a source of concern when a definition is found, but whennot

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the groups that now doubt their own status achieve consensus about their past and present accomplishments.” There may be consensus on a number of issues, including public administration’s past and present achievements, and that it is punctuated by various intellectual developments or movements.

However, dissension arises with respect to the importance or of those contributions,significance developments, and movements, particularly when evaluated from the standpoint of methodology. Dissonance has been seen most vividly over the Waldo–Simon debates, and who prevailed. Bertelli and Lynn (2006, 46, 48, 179n.13), for example, take quite a few digs at Waldo’s accomplishment, particularly in comparison with Simon’s. They suggest that unlike Simon, Waldo was a one-trick pony, unable to move on to new intellectual ground after . Also, again evaluating Simon againstThe Administrative State Waldo, they point out that Simon as well as Robert Dahl “went on to establish themselves as among the finest social scientist of their generation” (Bertelli and Lynn 2006, 48). They go on to say that “it is Simon who was awarded the American Society for Public Administration’s Dwight Waldo Award, not vice versa” (Bertelli and Lynn (2006, 48).

Bertelli and Lynn (2006, 48) classify Waldo as a postmodernist and antipositivist. Referencing the works of others, they see him as “a practitioner of hermeneutics,” with a “humanistic-literary bias” and “intimations of Derrida and deconstructionism.” Citing Taylor’s (2004) op-ed commentary in the New

, they argue that “‘the guiding insight of deconstruction … is that every structure—be itYork Times literary, psychological, social, economic, political or religious—that organizes our experiences is constituted and maintained through acts of exclusion. In the process of creating something, [something] else inevitably gets left out. These exclusive structures can become repressive—and that repression comes with consequences…. What is repressed does not disappear but always returns to unsettle every construction, no matter how secure it seems.’ While Waldo never puts the matter so clearly, this formulation may well sum up his worldview.”

Conversely, many scholars have acknowledged Waldo’s salient contributions to the field. For example, Rosenbloom and McCurdy (2006, ix, 1, 4) state that Waldo’s The Administrative State “fundamentally changed the study of public administration, presumably forever” and that it has achieved “iconic status.” They praise Waldo as one of the leading figures in public administration. They go on to5 say that “the rich literature on the relationship of bureaucracy to democracy, representative bureaucracy, participatory bureaucracy, grassroots administration and related topics that developed after 1948 owes much of its intellectual origins to Waldo’s work…. By the 1950s, Waldo was widely recognized as a major public administration thinker. From the late 1950s, if not earlier, through the 1970s, he was generally considered the leading academic in the field.”

Some have even dedicated their books to him. Rosenbloom (1988a) did so with the first edition of his public administration text, Public Administration: Understanding Management, Politics and Law in the

. So, too, did Stillman (1991), in Public Sector Preface to Public Administration: A Search for Themes .and Directions

As alluded to in , the battle lines among contemporary scholars about the field’s scientificitychapter 1 and whose contributions are more estimable, Waldo’s or Simon’s, are drawn in stone. Thus there is no consensus in the field on a particular school of thought or methodology.

Another critical point, as mentioned above, is that Kuhn’s contextual framework, as well as all the examples he raises in his book, are grounded in the natural or physical sciences. He repeatedly points to Newtonian mechanics, Einsteinian dynamics, and Copernican cosmology to support his premise that paradigmatic disciplines are mature sciences. He also stated that without a commitment to a paradigm, there could be no normal science. Perhaps his hidden subtext was that only the natural sciences are or can be paradigmatic and, hence, characterized as normal sciences.

Public administration, then, as with any of the other branches of the social sciences, can only be preparadigmatic or nonparadigmatic because no single paradigm exists or has emerged during the stages of scientific inquiry. Moreover, according to Kuhn, only paradigmatic disciplines can be classified as “mature,” normal sciences. If we accept these premises, then a preparadigmatic or nonparadigmatic discipline such as public administration cannot be a normal, paradigm-governed science, but may be better taxonomized as a “postnormal science.”

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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS A POSTNORMAL SCIENCE “Postnormal science” is a concept conceived and articulated by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992, 1993, 1994) to address the existence of societal and ethical complexities in the environments we study. A postnormal science is a process of inquiry for which objectivity is not always achievable. Environmental factors, particularly politics, interfere with the quest for objectivity, and, consequently, prediction and control are limited. A postnormal science, according to Funtowicz and Ravetz, is one that is relevant when high risks, uncertainty, and divergent values prevail. It urges new methods in the development and application of scientific knowledge, an extended peer community (i.e., one where a dialogue is created among all stakeholders, regardless of their official position or qualifications), and an “extension” of facts (Sardar 2000; Dempster 1998). Funtowicz and Ravetz (1992, 254), in effect, have called for a broader conception of science, or “the democratization of science.”

Of particular importance, the postnormal sciences operate with a different level of assumptions as compared with the normal sciences. For instance, unlike the normal sciences, which are assumed to be both certain and value free, postnormal science, as Ravetz (1999, 647) points out, “makes ‘systems uncertainties’ and ‘decision stakes’ the essential elements of its analysis.” He goes on to say that the

insight leading to Post-Normal Science is that in the sorts of issue-driven science relating to environmental debates, typically facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high, and decisions urgent. Some might say that such problems should not be called ‘science’; but the answer could be that such problems are everywhere, and when science is (as it must be) applied to them, the conditions are anything but “normal.” For the previous distinction between “hard,” objective scientific facts and “soft,” subjective value judgments is now inverted. All too often, we must make hard policy decisions where our only scientific inputs are irremediably soft. In such contexts of policy making, there is a new role for natural science. The facts that are taught from textbooks in institutions are still necessary, but are no longer sufficient. For these relate to a standardised version of the natural world, frequently to the artificially pure and stable conditions of a laboratory experiment. The world is quite different when we interact with it, either destructively or constructively…. Contrary to the impression conveyed by textbooks, most problems in practice have more than one plausible answer, and many have no answer at all. (Ravetz 1999, 649)

Funtowicz and Ravetz (2008) characterize environmental policy as a postnormal science. They acknowledge that the environment is in the domain of “science,” given its immersion in the world of nature. But they go on to say that we have never been nor ever will be the “masters and possessors of Nature.” The uncertainty and complexity of the environment warrant the use of new intellectual tools to study the structure and properties of the phenomena underlying environmental problems. They argue for linking epistemological stances with suitable methods but, most important, they call for pluralist representations of knowledge. They reject the narrow conception of positivism as the one best way and instead call for approaches that are broader and more inclusive of different epistemic traditions and methodologies.

Postnormal science has been applied to a number of different fields, including ecological economics (Swedeen 2006; Muller 2003), food safety (Ravetz 2002), medicine (Sweeney and Kernick 2002; Laugharne and Laugharne 2002), and climate science (Bray and von Storch 1999; Saloranta 2001). In all these fields, research and action depend upon value-laden decisions that are inescapably made in the face of uncertainty. Postnormal science moves beyond traditional research, where certainties prevail, to a method where the quality of the research process is primary (see Turnpenny 2003).

If public administration cannot be characterized as normal science, perhaps postnormal science is a more fitting classification. If this is the case, what should its approach to research be? How should scientific inquiry be carried out? How do the various approaches to research postulate reality and truth, and by what means do we arrive at the truth in public administration—or, more broadly, the social sciences? Is it “scientific” methods that lead us to the truth? And what exactly constitute methods grounded in “science?” How will we know if or when we have arrived at the truth?

Before turning to these questions in , the next chapter examines the issues of identity criseschapter 4 and paradigmatic bases in the other social sciences, illustrating that public administration is not unique in its constant quest for an “identity.”


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1. See Rainey 1994; Lakatos and Musgrave 1970. 2. It should be noted, however, that given the circumscribed conditions for which relativity is

applicable or suitable, (e.g., when extreme accuracy is a prerequisite or when dealing with gravitation for very massive objects), Newton’s Law continues to be used as an excellent approximation of the effects of gravity.

3. Of course, public administration can “belong” to departments, programs, or schools of public administration, public affairs, public policy, political science, business administration, etc. This exacerbates the “identity” conundrum in the field.

4. See Kuhlmann, Bogumil, and Grohs 2008; Page 2005; Cheung 2005; Gow and Dufour 2000; Borins 1999; Mathiasen 1999; Aucoin 1995.

5. Rosenbloom and McCurdy’s (2006) edited book emanated from a symposium they organized at American University to commemorate Waldo’s .The Administrative State

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CHAPTER 3 Identity Crises in the Social Sciences

Public administration is not the only social science that has grappled with questions of identity and the significance of paradigms (see, e.g., Dubnick 1999). Other social sciences have also subjected their research traditions to epistemological and ontological gauntlets in search of a paradigmatic base or precise identity through which to promote scientific rigor or “science” in their respective fields or disciplines. These debates have predominantly revolved around epistemic traditions and research methodology, and not surprisingly have pitted positivism against postpositivism—which acknowledges the value of qualitative methodologies—or other philosophies of science. As Rosenberg (2008, 1) points out, “There is no perfect agreement among economists, anthropologists, sociologists, or psychologists on what the distinctive and central problems and methods of their respective disciplines are.”

To avoid tedium and repetition, given the epistemological debates in public administration presented earlier in this volume, this chapter provides only a brief overview of the discourse in other social sciences concerned with identity and paradigms. But an important point to be made is that even those branches of the social sciences (e.g., political science and sociology) that are not applied or as closely identified with practice as public administration struggle with questions of identity, paradigmatic base, and appropriate research methodology.

POLITICAL SCIENCE In political science, intellectual squabbles over aims and research methods have long peppered the discourse (e.g., Brady and Collier 2004; deLeon 1998; Ellwood 1996; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Weimer 1992; Gun-nell 1991; Ricci 1984). Many have argued that political science is more a behavioral science (i.e., a quantitatively empirical undertaking), whereas others have maintained that it is systematic thought about politics (i.e., ethics, morality, and values). Perhaps deLeon (1998, 150) succinctly captured the factiousness as follows: “Political scientists as a discipline have spent (almost literally) countless articles and books proposing something resembling ‘laws’ or theories that, taken collectively or individually, have produced infinitely more confusion than clarity.” To bolster his case, deLeon juxtaposes the works of a number of eminent political science philosophers, such as James Rosenau and Charles Lindblom. As deLeon (1998, 150) points out, Rosenau saw the primary purpose of political science as moving “up the ladder of generalization and construct[ing] theories that encompass and explain more and more of the phenomena that make up the universe of politics.” Lindblom (1990), conversely, questioned the utility of social science findings for social tasks or efforts.any

As with public administration, political scientists line both sides of the gauntlet, arguing that political behavior is best understood through explanatory techniques (the positivists) or through reason, description, or prescription. Torgerson (1986, 34), for example, argues that positivism “would rigorously distance itself from the speculations of theology and metaphysics, confronting the world objectively in to observe the facts and determine the lawful of nature and society. The domain of mystery and ambiguity would be abandoned in to know what could be known clearly and certainly…. Knowledge would replace politics.” Others, such as deLeon (1998, 151), counter that “positivism is fundamentally antithetical to democratic principles and processes. Another claim is that, in its search for objectivity, it conveniently overlooks the pivotal hurly-burly of political life, and especially the contending value structures.”1

Some political scientists have argued that qualitative research encompasses positivism. Lin (1998, 162), for example, takes this position, arguing that “positivist work seeks to identify qualitative data with propositions that can then be tested or identified in other cases…. Qualitative work can be positivist: It can attempt to document practices that lead consistently to one set of outcomes rather than another, to identify characteristics that commonly are related to some policy problem, or to find strategic patterns that hold across different venues and with different actors.”2

As with public administration, myriad treatises can be offered to illustrate the dialectical exchanges

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