VanguardOfValorVolumeII.pdf

Combat Studies Institute Press
US Army Combined Arms Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

VANGUARD OF VALOR
Volume II

General Editor
Donald P. Wright, Ph. D.

Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan

Vanguard of Valor
Volume II

Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan

General Editor
Donald P. Wright, Ph. D.

Afghan Study Team Authors
Anthony E. Carlson, Ph. D.

Michael J. Doidge
Scott J. Gaitley

Kevin M. Hymel
Matt M. Matthews

Ryan D. Wadle, Ph. D.

Editing and Layout
Terry D. England
Carl W. Fischer
Deborah J. Seed

Graphics
Robin D. Kern

ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Vanguard of Valor II : Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan / general editor,
Donald P. Wright ; Afghan Study Team, Anthony E. Carlson … [et al.].
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Afghan War, 2001—Campaigns. 2. Counterinsurgency–Afghanistan.
3. United States. Army–History–Afghan War, 2001- 4. Afghanistan–
History, Military–21st century. I. Wright, Donald P., 1964- II. Carlson,
Anthony E.
DS371.412.V362 2012
958.104’742–dc23
2012014877

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a
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expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of
the author(s) and not necessarily those of the
Department of the Army or the Department of
Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications
available for downloading can be found at

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an
official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any
republication without the express written permission of the Director of CSI.

iii

Foreword

Beginning in 2009, the United States and many of its NATO-ISAF
partners dramatically raised their levels of effort in Afghanistan. The
“Afghan Surge,” as it came to be known, was most evident in the number
of additional US and allied troops that arrived in Afghanistan in 2009
and 2010. Their mission was clear: To reverse the Taliban’s momentum
and deny it the ability to overthrow the government, and to strengthen
the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they
could assume lead responsibility for their nation’s future.

For US Army units, the ways of creating stability and furthering the
reach of the Afghan Government took several forms. First and foremost,
US Soldiers executed complex and difficult offensive operations to seize
territory that had often been held by insurgents for years. These combat
actions were often complemented by civic action projects that were carried
out together with US diplomats and development specialists. Additionally,
US Soldiers formed close partnerships with Afghan Army and Police units
to accelerate the growth of the Afghan security forces’ capabilities.

At the heart of all of these efforts were the men and women who served
in front line units during what has become longest war in our Nation’s
history. In my time as the senior US commander in Afghanistan and as US
Ambassador to that country, I recognized that the success of the campaign
depended greatly on the skill, valor, and grit of our Army Soldiers. This
was true especially of the sergeants, lieutenants, and captains who make
critical decisions under stressful combat conditions and interact on a
regular basis with Afghan Soldiers and civilians.

The present volume, Vanguard of Valor II, offers six accounts of US
Soldiers at the tip of the spear during the Afghan campaign. The Combat
Studies Institute’s Vanguard of Valor series is intended to document small
unit actions in Afghanistan. These books play an equally important role by
offering insights to Soldiers who may find themselves in the years ahead
under similar conditions, whether in Afghanistan or in some other troubled
land where they have been deployed to conduct the dangerous business of
defending the national interest in a theater of war.

Karl W. Eikenberry
Ambassador and Lieutenant General
US Army (Retired)
Stanford University

v

Acknowledgements

This volume of the Vanguard of Valor series continues the Combat
Studies Institute’s effort to document small unit actions in Afghanistan.
The study of these actions afford leaders the opportunity to better prepare
themselves for continued operations in Afghanistan and for future conflicts
yet to be determined by our nation’s interests.

Mr. Robert J. Dalessandro, Chief of Military History, and Dr. Richard W.
Stewart, Chief Historian of the Army, were instrumental in the production
of this book. Their continued vision and support of CSI as a publisher
of contemporary military history allowed us to complete this volume. I
also wish to acknowledge the numerous Command Historians, Military
History Detachments, and the Operational Leadership Experiences’ oral
history interviewers for their collection efforts over the past decade;
without them this volume would not have been possible. I extend special
acknowledgement and thanks to the Soldiers who provided interviews and
first-hand accounts of the events about which these writings document.

The Afghan Study Team continues its work on the study of operations
and unit actions in Afghanistan. Future volumes will focus not only on
small units actions but will expand to examine battalion, brigade, and
divisional level operations. We will continue telling the story of Soldiers
serving on distant and difficult battlefields.

CSI – The Past is Prologue!

Roderick M. Cox
Colonel, US Army
Director, Combat Studies Institute

vii

Contents

Foreword ……………………………………………………………………………………. iii
Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………………… v
Contents ……………………………………………………………………………………. vii
List of Figures …………………………………………………………………………….. ix
Geographical Key to Operations Recounted in this Work …………….. xi
Chapter 1. Toe to Toe with the Taliban
Bravo Company Fights in Makuan
by Kevin M. Hymel …………………………………………………………………… 1
Chapter 2. Gaining the Initiative in Musahi
Using CERP to Disrupt the Taliban in Kabul Province
by Anthony E. Carlson, Ph. D. …………………………………………………… 29
Chapter 3. Partnership in Paktika Province, 2010-2011
by Ryan D. Wadle, Ph.D. ………………………………………………………….. 55
Chapter 4. Leading the Charge
A Cavalry Platoon’s Fight in Badghis Province
by Matt M. Matthews ……………………………………………………………….. 79
Chapter 5. Combat Multipliers
Tactical Female Engagement Teams in Paktika Province
by Michael J Doidge ………………………………………………………………. 105
Chapter 6. Securing Dan Patan
A US Infantry Squad’s Counterinsurgency Program in an Afghan
District
by Scott J. Gaitley ………………………………………………………………….. 125
Glossary ………………………………………………………………………………….. 147
About the Authors ……………………………………………………………………. 151

ix

List of Figures

Chapter 1.
Figure 1. The Makuan Operation, 14-18 September 2010 …………….. 4
Figure 2. Assault Breacher Vehicle cuts through grape field………….. 5
Figure 3. IEDs lay partially concealed ……………………………………….. 6
Figure 4. Soldier conducts a bomb damage assessment ………………. 12

Chapter 2.
Figure 1. Kabul Province and the Musahi District …………………….. 32
Figure 2. The Musahi valley …………………………………………………… 33
Figure 3. ANP Officer Distributes HA Supplies in Mushai valley .. 39
Figure 4. Musahi Child Clutches a Blanket Received during HA … 40
Figure 5. Musahi Taliban Weapons Cache ……………………………….. 44
Figure 6. Wreckage of the Musahi District Government Center ….. 45

Chapter 3.
Figure 1. Map of Paktika Province …………………………………………… 58
Figure 2. Team building dinner for the US and ANA RCPs ……….. 67

Chapter 4.
Figure 1. Badghis Province and Bala Morghab District………………. 80
Figure 2. Red Platoon Operations, 3-4 April, 2011 …………………….. 86
Figure 3. Conducting SLE in Kamusari 4 April 2011 …………………. 88
Figure 4. Forward observer secures a sector of Kamusari Village .. 90
Figure 5. Engage the enemy from OP Reaper 4 …………………………. 94
Figure 6. Air Force B-1 Lancer drops a guided bomb ………………… 98

Chapter 5.
Figure 1. Staff Sergeant Denise Ferniza with Afghan children …….113
Figure 2. Staff Sergeant Ferniza instructs in combat medicine …….119
Figure 3. Sergeant Ashley Dixon on an engagement ………………… 120
Figure 4. Sergeant Major Joseph Singerhouse with FETs ………….. 121

x

Chapter 6.
Figure 1. Afghan Local Police sites ………………………………………… 128
Figure 2. Dan Patan district geographical reference map ………….. 133

xi

Geographical Key to Operations Recounted in this Work.

1

Toe to Toe with the Taliban
Bravo Company Fights in Makuan

by
Kevin M. Hymel

Confusion reigned. An improvised explosive device (IED) had just
detonated beneath the boot of an American lieutenant, tearing through the
men of 2d Platoon. Soldiers screamed and yelled. Those not tossed into the
air were thrown to the ground. The device had exploded only 15 minutes
after two other IEDs ripped through 3d Platoon, which 2d Platoon was
attempting to support. The blasts rendered both platoons ineffective. The
Afghan town of Makuan was proving itself a deadly place for the men of
Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment (1-502d IN), 2d
Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault).

Bravo Company had entered Makuan the previous day to clear the
area of IEDs, bomb-making facilities, and insurgents. On this night of 17
September 2010, the Soldiers conducted a clearing operation before they
were to head south toward the Arghandab River, one kilometer away. Most
of Bravo’s noncommissioned officers (NCOs) hated moving through an
area strewn with IEDs at night, but they had their s. Now, in only a
few minutes, a clearing operation had become a company commander’s
nightmare: a mass casualty situation.

The Plan
Bravo Company’s mission in Makuan was part of Operation DRAGON

STRIKE, a brigade-sized operation designed to clear the Taliban out of
Kandahar Province’s Zhari District in southeastern Afghanistan. The town
of Makuan was located approximately 24 kilometers west of Kandahar, one
kilometer south of Highway One, and a kilometer north of the Arghandab
River. As the main east-west route between Kandahar to the east and
Gereshk to the west, Highway One proved a favorite Taliban target. The
Taliban used Makuan as an IED factory, a bed-down area for insurgents
moving in and out of Kandahar, and a consolidation position for attacks
on Highway One traffic. Protected from the north by a series of IED belts,
Makuan contained an active enemy who had driven the civilians out of
the area.1

Makuan consisted of a series of mud compounds and grape huts
surrounded by grape rows, marijuana fields, and pomegranate orchards—
some of which were separated by mud walls. The dense terrain resembled
the hedgerow country of 1944 Normandy, France. Grape vines stood as

2

tall as a Soldier. “When you step into them, you just disappear,” said
Captain James “Brandon” Prisock, Bravo Company’s commander. A canal
ran east-to-west just north of the town, with numerous wadis—dry river
beds—running through the area.2

To drive the enemy out of Makuan, Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Davis,
the 1-502d IN commander, tasked Charlie Company, on the battalion’s
right flank, with attacking an area eight kilometers northeast of Makuan,
east of the city of Senjaray and pushing down to the Arghandab River.
Simultaneously, he ed Alpha Company to attack south out of Senjaray.
With these shaping operations distracting the enemy, Bravo Company, a
company of US Army Rangers, and an Afghanistan National Army (ANA)
company would air-assault south of Makuan. The combined force would
advance north, clearing the town of insurgents and IEDs. The surprised
enemy would have nowhere to run but north, into the battalion’s Delta
Company and Headquarters and Headquarters Company, positioned along
Highway One. The air assault was set for 12 September 2010.3

Bravo Company had been fighting the Taliban along Highway One
since late May 2010, engaging the enemy two or three times a day. “We
lost a lot of guys in the beginning,” said Specialist Jason Leigh, the
company radio telephone operator (RTO). “We had a lot of casualties.”4
The company had been split between two Combat Out Posts (COPs) in the
village of Pashmul, approximately four kilometers southwest of Makuan.
When Bravo transferred to FOB Wilson, northwest of Makuan, the whole
unit reunited and received a new commander. Captain Prisock took over
Bravo on 5 September, seven days before DRAGON STRIKE’s expected
kick-off date. He had served a tour in Iraq and helped plan DRAGON
STRIKE as a member of the battalion’s operations staff. The arrival of a
new commander and the unit’s consolidation had a profound effect on the
men. “Morale changed,” explained Captain Luke Rella, the company’s
executive officer (XO). “People started actually feeling like they were part
of a team again, and they really cared about the unit.”5

Captain Prisock had studied the enemy’s tactics. He read The Other Side
of the Mountain, a book about mujahideen attacks on Soviets during the
Soviet-Afghan War, specifically the section on ambushes along Highway
One, north of Makuan. “[The Taliban] were fighting from the exact same
positions that [the mujahideen] fought [the Soviets],” explained Prisock.
“We noticed that they were fighting in the exact same way.”6

Captain Prisock’s command included three rifle platoons: First
Lieutenant Charles Ragland’s 1st Platoon, First Lieutenant Taylor

3

Murphy’s 2d Platoon, and First Lieutenant Nicholas Williams’ 3d
Platoon. All three platoon leaders were on their first combat tour, but
their noncommissioned officers were combat veterans. Prisock also had
extra assets for his mission: a squad of engineers, an Explosive Ordnance
Disposal (EOD) team, a Human Intelligence Collection Team, and the
battalion’s Advanced Trauma Life Support unit. He also received an
Assault Breacher Vehicle platoon from the US Marine Corps; Seabees
(engineers) from the US Navy; and bomb-sniffing dogs from both the US
Air Force and the Navy. The extra units swelled Bravo Company to the
equivalent of nine platoons.7

Charlie Company launched its attack on 7 September, “and boy, did
they bring out the enemy,” said Lieutenant Colonel Davis, “and that set up
the conditions for us to push Bravo Company.”8 While Charlie Company
engaged the enemy, the men of Bravo Company rehearsed the air assault
at FOB Wilson. They were ready, but as the 12 September date drew
near, the Rangers were committed to a different mission and a storm front
threatened to ground the assault helicopters. The date was pushed back
twice until 14 September at 2230, when the men were told to stand down
for 48 hours. An hour later, as the Bravo men bedded down, s came
that the operation would kick off in about eight hours. Most of the soldiers
were awakened out of their first sleep in days and scrambled to get ready.9

The air assault had been cancelled, but with the larger operation already
underway, Lieutenant Colonel Davis needed Bravo Company to conduct
a ground attack. The men now had eight hours to get themselves to an
Afghan National Police (ANP) station five miles northeast on Highway
One for the jump-off. “It was a mess,” said the company’s First Sergeant
Nathan Stone, “but we moved.” Stone organized the men into chalks, just
as he would for an air assault. “We just used our vehicles like helicopters,”
he explained.10 Stone placed milk crates where the trucks would arrive.
Men lined up and counted off as they mounted the trucks, which then
whisked them down Highway One. The trucks then made round trips
to pick up other chalks. Some of the soldiers worried that the massive
movement would alert the insurgents. “We’re definitely tipping our hand
[to the enemy] at that point,” commented Lieutenant Nicholas Williams.11
First Sergeant Stone boarded the last truck and arrived at the ANP station
just as the company began moving south toward Makuan. “That’s how
hard we pushed it,” he said.12

4

Breaching by MICLIC
Bravo Company did not attack alone. Three US Marine Corps Assault

Breacher Vehicles (ABVs), M1 tank chassis fitted with a mine plow and
M58 Mine Clearing Line Charges (MICLICs), would breach the enemy
lines and eliminate any IEDs awaiting the infantry. Accompanying the
ABVs were two M88 Tank Recovery Vehicles, armed with .50-caliber
machine guns and IED plows, and a number of Mine Resistant Ambush
Protected (MRAP) vehicles. Captain Prisock positioned Bravo Company
behind the ABVs. Once the ABVs started rolling forward, the men would
advance and protect their flanks.

Figure 1. The Makuan Operation, 14-18 September 2010.

As the sun rose on 15 September, one of the ABVs fired a MICLIC,
commencing the operation. Like a spider shooting a web, the MICLIC
rocket shot out of the ABV as the line charge uncoiled behind it. The
rocket arced over the IED-strewn grape field and landed 100 meters away.
The line charge then detonated, shaking the earth and raising a huge, long
cloud of dirt. Sympathetic detonations added to the power of the explosion.
When the dust settled, an eight-meter-wide path had been cut through

5

the IEDs in the grape rows. Everyone remembered the power of the
MICLIC. “You can see the earth move in front of you,” said Sergeant Zac
McDonald.13 “Those are the loudest things you’ll ever hear in your life,”
added Air Force Staff Sergeant Brent Olson, one of Bravo Company’s dog
handlers.14 “Everything feels tight for a minute,” explained Staff Sergeant
Nicholas Christensen, “[your] ears are ringing, and the dust. It’s almost too
much to bear, but then it ends quickly.”15 Staff Sergeant Joseph Roberts
may have explained the effect best when he said, “It’s like a precursor to
the things to come.”16 Insurgents began running away from a wadi line just
south of the breach. A Soldier in the ANP station’s tower, manning a Mark
19 40mm grenade launcher, fired rounds at the exposed enemy while the
Marine ABVs opened up with their .50-caliber machine guns.17

Figure 2. An Assault Breacher Vehicle (ABV) cuts through the grape field en route
to Makuan.

Photo courtesy of Captain Nicholas Williams

Ten minutes after the first MICLIC fired, the ABV rolled through the
initial breach point, shot a second MICLIC into the sky, and again clanked
forward. But when it fired a third MICLIC, the line charge failed to explode.
A Marine ran out of the vehicle, attached hand-held charges and detonated
it himself.18 “That guy right there deserves a medal,” said First Sergeant
Stone. After the third explosion, Bravo’s men moved to the ABV’s flanks,
providing security. “We were worried that [the enemy] would try and take

6

it out,” explained Stone.19 Unfortunately, the MICLIC’s devastating effects
made the bomb-sniffing dogs paranoid and edgy. According to Lieutenant
Murphy, walking though an area blasted by a MICLIC “kind of messed
up their noses because you have 2,000 pounds of explosive ordnance out
there. So having them out during the initial breach is what really screwed
them up for the whole operation.”20

The Bridge at the Canal
At 1000 Bravo Company reached a bridge over a canal running east

to west across the direction of attack. Homemade explosive bags were
stuffed beneath the bridge and a 10-foot pipe was buried across it. On the
other side of the bridge, an IED hung from a tree. It was a clever ploy.
Anyone disarming the IEDs on the bridge would expose themselves to the
tree-borne IED. A waiting insurgent could detonate them both. “Anybody
exposed is going to get hit by shrapnel,” said Prisock. The Marines fired
a MICLIC over the bridge, but the resulting explosion failed to ignite the
explosives on the bridge. The EOD men explained to Prisock that they
could not blow the bridge without first securing the other end. The threat
of enemy attack by direct and indirect fire was simply too great.21

Figure 3. Two IEDs lay partially concealed on the far bank of the bridge over the
canal (inside circle).

Photo courtesy of First Lieutenant Taylor Murphy

7

Captain Prisock called in an airstrike. Two A-10 Thunderbolt II
ground-attack aircraft swooped in and dropped two 500-pound Guided
Bomb Units (GBUs), destroying the bridge and detonating approximately
nine IEDs. Prisock then ed two MICLICs to fire east and west of
the bridge, parallel to the canal, detonating seven IEDs and clearing out
a wider avenue of approach. The Seabees began plowing mud with their
D7 bulldozers, creating an impromptu bridge, but they failed to transport
a collection of large steel pipes that would have served as the base for
the mound, allowing water to flow through the new bridge. By 1600,
with nowhere for the water to go, the area flooded. Prisock explained
to the Seabees what needed to be done and oversaw their work. “It was
just weird,” said Lieutenant Williams, “having infantry guys telling the
Seabees, whose job it is to build stuff, how to build the bridge.”22 Stalled
at the bridge, Bravo Company could no longer keep driving the enemy in
front of it. Replacing the bridge seriously delayed the push to Makuan.23

Lieutenant Ragland’s 1st Platoon and Lieutenant Murphy’s 2d Platoon
pulled security along the canal’s north bank, east and west of the bridge,
respectively. Ragland deployed behind a dirt berm when one of his soldiers,
Specialist Mark Baidinger, told Sergeant Nicholas Christensen he had to
see the medic. Christensen agreed but told him to walk behind him and not
up on the berm, where he would be exposed. “Roger, Sergeant,” Baidinger
said, but stepped on top of the berm anyway.24 Suddenly, the enemy opened
fire from across the canal with a B-10 82mm recoilless rifle. The round hit
a tree above Baidinger, raining shrapnel and lacerating his left arm, leg and
back, and breaking his femur. A piece of shrapnel caught Sergeant Derek
Dodd in the neck. Several Soldiers carried Baidinger to the rear while
Captain Prisock called for a medical evacuation (MEDEVAC). Sergeant
Dodd stayed in the fight.25

The enemy then opened up with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs),
machine guns, and AK47 assault rifles from behind a mud wall. Both
platoons returned fire with small arms and an M240 medium machine gun.
Soon 60mm and 120mm mortars, along with 155mm artillery, added to
the fight. “[We] could see them moving in the wood line,” explained Staff
Sergeant Zac McDonald. “They weren’t static.” With the canal separating
the enemy from the two platoons and the bridge unusable, the Americans
could only return fire. “We weren’t in a situation where we could chase
them,” McDonald added.26 Instead of firing from cover, the untrained ANA
soldiers stood up while shooting from the hip. They simply lacked the
Americans’ level of training and did not have enough time in the field.27

8

When Prisock’s 60mm mortars ran out of ammunition, Captain Rella
sent for resupply, and a Light Medium Tactical Vehicle (LMTV) sped
down the dirt road to the mortar position. Soldiers threw green smoke
grenades to cover the mortar crews running back to retrieve the ammo.
Unfortunately, the smoke served an unintended purpose: the MEDEVAC
HH-60 Black Hawk helicopter pilot, misinterpreting the smoke as a
landing zone, swooped in and tried to land within range of the enemy
fire. Specialist Leigh tried to raise the pilot on the radio, but could not
find his frequency. He then contacted the battalion headquarters, hoping
they would relay his directions to the HH-60 before it landed. First
Sergeant Stone threw clods of dirt at the helicopter, trying to get the pilot’s
attention. Other Soldiers stopped firing, ran over to the landing helicopter,
and waved it off. The helicopter then circled and tried to land again. The
men repeated the process. Finally, the Black Hawk left the firefight and
landed in 3d Platoon’s rear perimeter. “He basically landed right on top
of me,” explained Staff Sergeant Joseph Jackel, who told the MEDEVAC
crew chief, “Get the hell out here! We’ve already got the casualty up on
the road.”28

The mortars made the difference. The suppression provided by the high
explosive rounds and the smoke provided by the white phosphorous rounds
eventually gave the Americans fire superiority over their well-entrenched
enemy. When the insurgents broke contact, Lieutenant Williams led his
platoon splashing across the canal, where they found a big mud wall from
where the enemy had fired. Holes were dug under the wall for hideouts and
weapons storage. Bravo Company encountered more of these mud walls
throughout the operation. “The area where we were was almost built for
trench warfare,” explained Lieutenant Charles Ragland.29

Makuan
After the initial confrontation, the company cleared the final 200 meters

south into Makuan. With the sun setting, Lieutenant Williams wanted to
move quickly, but refused to rush his men in an IED-infested area. In the
darkness, the men secured two compounds on the town’s northeast corner,
designated Strong Point One and Strong Point Two. Bravo Company’s
Headquarters and 1st and 2d platoons occupied Strong Point One, while
3d Platoon and most of the ANA occupied Strong Point Two. Using white
lights attached to their rifles and mine detectors, the men cleared the
buildings. “If we saw something,” explained Lieutenant Williams, “we
tied 550 [cord] to it, we backed out of the room and we’d pull it in case
it was some kind of tamper.”30 For security, Lieutenant Murphy’s mortar
crews emplaced their weapons and fired off a few illumination rounds to

9

set their base plates into the ground. During this part of the operation, the
men of Bravo Company encountered no one.31

The exhausted men finished clearing the strong points by 0130 the
next morning. Some Soldiers set up security positions while others bedded
down. Unfortunately, everyone’s assault packs were north of the canal,
leaving the men to curl up on the floor without their blankets or cold-
weather gear as the temperature dropped. Many Soldiers were still wet
from the canal crossing. Making matters worse, Army engineers began
blowing up a nearby tree line to provide better fields of fire and deprive
the enemy of cover and concealment. The engineers attached blocks of
C4 to the trees and ignited the fuses.32 Some white phosphorous from the
day’s battle set off one of the fuses early. An engineer smelled the burning
fuse and told everyone to get inside the compound, which they did as the
charge detonated. “No one was injured,” said Murphy, “but that was a
close call.”33

The engineers’ work proved dangerous for Bravo’s men. Lieutenant
Ragland was talking to one of his team leaders inside Strong Point One
when an explosion erupted outside. “A huge fireball comes in the room,”
recalled Ragland. “We thought we were getting attacked.”34 Other nearby
detonations lifted sleeping men off the floor and slammed them back down.
Sergeant Christensen was sleeping in a sheep hut when a huge explosion
woke him. He thought an RPG had hit. Grabbing his rifle, he escaped
as the roof caved in. Once out, he ran into Prisock, who asked “Are you
okay?”35 He was, but the engineers continued their work until daylight,
making sleep difficult for the men.36

First Day in Makuan
By 0300 that morning, the tired Soldiers of Bravo Company began

clearing Makuan. Lieutenants Murphy and Williams’ platoons cleared
compounds, while Ragland’s 1st Platoon leveled the trees lines along the
wadis. With all their heavy support vehicles north of the canal, the men
used C4 explosives to blow holes in mud walls surrounding pomegranate
orchards and fired anti-personnel obstacle …