ArticlePoliticalandFunctionalLocalGovernmentConsolidation.pdf

American Review of Public Administration
2014, Vol. 44(4S) 29S –46S

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DOI: 10.1177/0275074014533003

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Article

Political and Functional Local
Government Consolidation:
The Challenges for Core Public
Administration Values and Regional
Reform

Suzanne Leland1 and Kurt Thurmaier2

Abstract
This analysis explores the options for a theoretical model to guide regional collaboration by
local governments that is both politically feasible and consistent with core public administration
values. The analysis first examines the research on the adoption, implementation and
performance of political consolidation. We then examine the theory and research that underlie
functional consolidation and assess both types in lieu of the values of public administration. We
find that local government managers and elected officials need a theoretical model for regional
collaboration that addresses a key obstacle to service consolidation among local governments:
the perceived loss of political power and control associated with consolidation efforts. We
suggest multilevel governance theory and the concept of shared sovereignty offer an approach
to regional problems with an eye to the political as well as administrative issues, and with
instruments that promote core public administration values. The concept of shared sovereignty
that underpins the regional collaboration of the countries in Europe has both descriptive and
predictive theoretical potential as a multilevel governance theory. The EU functions from a web
of interlaced, interdependent agreements to share sovereignty in ways that manage political
issues, economic factors, and administrative values, and in a fashion aligned with core PA values
in the US.

Keywords
consolidation, local government, metropolitan, regionalism

In recent years, most public administration (PA) scholars have followed public officials and
turned away from the creation of a metropolitan government to manage regional problems and
deliver services, deeming the idea politically infeasible (Parks & Oakerson, 2000; Stephens &
Wikstrom, 2000). Instead, the alternative is that smaller political jurisdictions dot the urban land-
scape in the form of cities, towns, counties, special districts, and school districts. The fragmented
system of local government remains as the preferred choice for most citizens and they seldom

1University of North Carolina at Charlotte, NC, USA
2Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL, USA

Corresponding Author:
Suzanne Leland, University of North Carolina at Charlotte, 9201 University City, Charlotte, NC 28223, USA.
Email: [email protected]

533003ARPXXX10.1177/0275074014533003American Review of Public AdministrationLeland and Thurmaier
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30S American Review of Public Administration 44(4S)

vote for any structure that unifies them. Public administrators also understand such political con-
straints, but often long for something more to address regional issues from a general purpose
government perspective.

However, the dispersion of political authority continues as a key feature of our federal system.
Regional governments that cover a metropolitan area such as the Metropolitan Council in the
Minneapolis–St. Paul area or Miami–Dade County are the only examples in the United States
(Orfield, 1998). Instead, citizens and scholars alike have embraced small-scale regional gover-
nance reforms such as metropolitan planning organizations or regional councils of governments
to maintain local control. These are loosely structured organizations that often lack the “teeth”
and political power to manage large-scale metropolitan issues, such as land use planning, growth,
and economic development. They are simply not a substitute for the political power that a metro-
politan unified government could wield.

City–county consolidations (political and functional) appear to be a middle-ground option for
regional government reformers than the creation of metropolitan-wide general purpose govern-
ments. Therefore the idea has traction and is frequently debated in jurisdictions across the United
States and in a few instances, adopted. A political city–county consolidation merges two or more
political structures (typically a county and the largest city in the county) and can include the
annexation of unincorporated areas. While rare,1 such political consolidations remain on the
agenda and occasionally are on the ballot in cities and counties across the country. More fre-
quently, local governments have adopted functional consolidation of city and county services
that overlap, such as law enforcement, parks and recreation, and sewer and water. But functional
consolidations, too, remain controversial and are not widely adopted.

The following analysis first examines the research on the adoption, implementation, and per-
formance of political consolidation.2 We then turn to examining the theory and research that
underlie functional consolidation and assess both types in lieu of the values of public administra-
tion, with some attention to the utility of borrowing the concepts of shared sovereignty and sub-
sidiarity from the constellation of functional consolidation in the European Union (EU).

What Does Consolidated Mean?

We agree with Hawkins, Ward, and Becker (1991) that there are degrees of consolidation. Both
functional and structural types of consolidation are complicated propositions, and both require
careful analysis and implementation. Community “blue ribbon” studies of city–county consoli-
dation do foster community-wide debates about regional problem solving and the key values that
underlie public administration: efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and accountability. Marando
(1968) asserts that such conversations are about what the future of the area should be and can
increase political participation among the electorate.

A city–county consolidation is considered a political consolidation because it merges two or
more general purpose political structures (typically a county and the largest city in the county)
into a single entity with a single elected body and a mayor or county executive. The unified gov-
ernment is usually defined as a city and a county for purposes of state mandates and taxing pow-
ers. There are two paths to political consolidation. Legislatures have the power to consolidate
local governments by legislative fiat. The most notable such consolidations are New York City
(1898), New Orleans (1805), and Indianapolis Unigov (1970).While legislative fiat is the method
used in European countries and Canada to reduce the number of local governments (Wollmann
& Thurmaier, 2012), such legislative measures are rare in the United States and have not occurred
in the past 50 years. The more common path to a city–county consolidation is through a citizen
referendum, and this path is the focus of most scholarly research on political consolidations. The
majority of these consolidation attempts occur in either smaller rural jurisdictions in states such
as Alaska, Montana, Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee or larger cities where population ranges
from 150,000 to around a million.

Leland and Thurmaier 31S

Political consolidation does not necessarily imply that all services from the former municipal-
ity are combined into one government with the county. Instead, this type of consolidation may
leave a considerable number of services such as police and fire unconsolidated at a city and
county service level. This was the case with Unigov, Indianapolis–Marion County, Indiana. Or a
consolidated government often establishes separate service districts with different tax rates, mir-
roring the old boundaries of the city and county, as was the case in Nashville–Davidson County,
Tennessee (Hawkins, 1966). Most political consolidations only pertain to the largest two general
purpose governments and exclude both special and school districts. So a consolidation may result
in the loss of one local government, but it does not necessarily entail a regional approach. Political
city–county consolidation does not typically include areas outside the home county, which in the
case of urban areas, a truly metropolitan-wide structure would.

Another important characteristic of most recent city–county consolidations in urban areas is
that smaller municipalities and towns remain excluded from the political consolidation and con-
tinue as independent elected bodies; they can “opt” out of the consolidation. For example,
Indianapolis–Marion County, Indiana, excluded four cities and one town when they consolidated
(Beech Grove, Lawrence, South Port, and the town of Speedway). Wyandotte County–Kansas
City, Kansas, excluded the cities of Bonner Springs, Edwardsville, and Lake Quivira (Leland &
Thurmaier, 2000). In Louisville–Jefferson County, Kentucky, 83 incorporated cities were
“included” in the consolidation but continued to have their own city councils (Savitch & Vogel,
2004).

It is also important to note that a consolidation does not necessarily lead to an overall reduc-
tion in the number of elected officials. In more than 50% of modern consolidation cases, the new,
combined city–county elected body contains the same number of elected officials as in the previ-
ous city and county, or even more. Smaller municipalities, which are almost always excluded in
city–county consolidations, continue to retain their elected bodies but also have representation in
the new unified government (Leland & Thurmaier, 2004). In Wyandotte County–Kansas City,
Kansas, which consolidated in 1997, one of the mayors of a town that was excluded from the
consolidated government (Edwardsville) was elected to the unified governing body and served in
both capacities (Leland & Thurmaier, 2010).

Functional consolidation involves merging specific service areas but leaving the political bod-
ies independent. These arrangements are more flexible than city–county consolidation because
over time, services can be added, deleted, or shifted between cities and counties (Savitch &
Vogel, 2000). While they preserve local autonomy, they can be characterized by instability if
arrangements are easily altered by elected officials’ turnover, whereas not a single structural
consolidation has reverted back to its pre-consolidation structure. Charlotte–Mecklenburg
County provides a good example of a city with 15 functionally consolidated services such as law
enforcement, parks and recreation, motor fleet services, sewer and water, building inspections,
animal control, and rideshare. They even share a building and use the same chambers for city
council meetings and county commission meetings. While there are no formal studies assessing
the efficiency of all of the consolidated services in Charlotte–Mecklenburg, the continuation of
the agreements suggests that they are probably beneficial and widely supported by the citizenry
(Mead, 2000).

Research Questions About Political Consolidation

There are two principal research questions regarding political consolidation.

Research Question 1: Which factors determine whether a consolidation attempt will be
successful?
Research Question 2: The “so what” question, does a consolidated government keep the
promises made by the reformers during the consolidation campaign?

32S American Review of Public Administration 44(4S)

Reformers and scholars alike have sought answers to these two important questions. To these
enduring questions we add two more. Do political consolidations enhance core public service
values such as efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and accountability better than functional consoli-
dation efforts? Does the European model of collaboration provide a more feasible mode of
enhancing these public service values at a regional level?

What Studies Tell Us About Consolidation Referenda

Only about 15% of consolidation referenda adopt a city–county merger proposal (Leland &
Thurmaier, 2004; Stephens & Wikstrom, 2000). What accounts for such a high failure rate of
city–county consolidation referenda? The classic consolidation model developed by Rosenbaum
and Kammerer (1974) asserts that consolidation prevails only under rare circumstances where
there is some kind of crisis in local government. They describe three necessary stages to achieve
passage: first, a crisis climate to precipitate such a radical reform; second, an inadequate or errant
response of local authorities to the crises that leads to the rejection of the local government struc-
ture (power deflation) by unhappy civic elites; and third, a catalytic event that accelerates the
consolidation debate and moves the voting public to support city–county consolidation. It is
worth noting that increased efficiency was not seen as a critical element of the Rosenbaum and
Kammerer model (the R&K model). The activities giving rise to consolidation had more to do
with the ineffectual response of governments to problems than gains in government efficiency
(Leland & Thurmaier, 2004).

The Consolidation Campaigns

Although the R&K model has received considerable attention (Carr & Feiock, 2002; Feiock &
Carr, 2000; Johnson, 2004; Johnson & Feiock, 1999; Messinger, 1989; Leland & Thurmaier,
2000), it has not been empirically validated. There have been several suggestions for modifica-
tions, notably by Messinger (1989), Johnson and Feiock (1999), Feiock and Carr (2000), and
Johnson (2004). First, the R&K model does not extend beyond getting a referendum on a ballot
(Johnson & Feiock, 1999). Second, the R&K model fails to note the importance of the role of the
civic elite who play critical roles in consolidation efforts (Carr & Feiock, 2002; Feiock & Carr,
2000; Fleischman, 2000). Third, the institutional contexts of city–county consolidation cam-
paigns are frequently ignored; this includes the statutory framework and socio-economic and
political factors of the communities (Leland & Thurmaier, 2004).

In 2004, Leland and Thurmaier revised the R&K model to account for these critiques. The C3
(city–county consolidation) model synthesizes previous consolidation literature and transforms
the extended stages patterns of the previous work into a set of measurable criteria that apply to
each of the consolidation movements that have reached a referendum in the United States over
the last century. It expands and modifies the basic R&K model in five important ways.

First, the C3 model focuses on the institutional framework in which the consolidation efforts
will occur; it emphasizes the importance of each state’s legal framework for inhibiting or enhanc-
ing consolidation efforts noting that the relationship between states and local governments is
unitary and not one of shared sovereignty like the national-state relationship. For example, 39
states do not have enabling legislation that allows for local governments to initiate such propos-
als (Leland & Thurmaier, 2004). This means special legislation must be passed by the legislature
and approved by the governor for a referendum to be held. Second, the C3 model expands the
characteristic alternative government responses in the R&K model to include voter alienation
(Messinger, 1989). Third, the model suggests that specific charter provisions may provoke spe-
cific interest group attitudes (elite or non-elite) toward the proposed charter, which may trigger
active participation (for or against) in the ensuing consolidation referendum campaign. Fourth,

Leland and Thurmaier 33S

the C3 model appends a referendum campaign stage suggested by Messinger (1989) and Johnson
and Feiock (1999) to the end of the basic R&K model, and divides the consolidation process into
two parts: “It is likely that the actors interested in—and capable of—accessing the local policy
agenda are different from those able and willing to pursue a county-wide referendum” (Carr &
Feiock, 1999, p. 477). Part 1 focuses on elite agenda-setting activities that culminate (or not) in
a consolidated government charter proposal that is presented to voters. It expects that whether the
civic elite are united or divided matters. Part 2 of the model focuses on the election campaigns
for and against the proposed charter, culminating in the referendum itself. The C3 model predicts
that the politics that lead to a charter proposal are not necessarily the same politics that contribute
to successful passage of the proposal in a referendum.

We do not regard the C3 model as a path-dependent model and maintain that the stages are
interdependent. Later stages are dependent on previous events. On the other hand, one of the
important characteristics of successful consolidation efforts is that the frequency of consolidation
failure in a particular county often corresponds to repeated attempts by advocates to achieve a
successful referendum vote. In that sense, initial stages of the latest round of reform efforts are
likely related to the later stages of a previous reform effort in the county. Finally, the C3 model
highlights the role that the civic elite play in the consolidation reform effort throughout the pro-
cess, both in leading to a charter proposal and in the campaign for voter approval.

Leland and Thurmaier (2004) led a team of 17 scholars who tested this model with a sophisti-
cated comparative case study design using 12 cases of consolidation referenda that occurred
between 1970 and 2000 (Leland & Thurmaier, 2004). The most important finding of the study is
that the basis of the consolidation campaign matters greatly. Campaigns emphasizing increased
governmental efficiency always lose; the voters do not seem to believe that promise. However,
campaigns that emphasize increased economic development for the community (now redefined
as the larger county-wide community) have a strong chance of success. This factor had not been
addressed in the R&K model, or previous research. Other important factors identified by the
study include the central importance of the sheriff’s support (campaigns fail without it), the legal
framework of state law conditions options and thus successful charters, minority protections for
electoral representation in the new governing body are necessary elements, and a safety net for
public employees (guaranteeing no job losses and no reductions in pay) are critical to precluding
active public sector opposition.

The Promises

Local government reformers have not been able to point to systematic evidence that consolidated
governments keep the promises of increasing accountability, equity, efficiency, and effectiveness
of local government service delivery (Reese, 2004). Various studies have challenged efficiency
and effectiveness claims of reformers, but usually based on a narrow case study or small samples.
In 2010, Thurmaier and Leland led a team of 16 scholars to assess the success of city–county
consolidations in a quasi-experimental comparative case study design of nine cases of consolida-
tion between 1970 and 2000. The study finds that efficiency gains are at best a 50-50 proposition,
but it is interesting to note that in this analysis, there is some evidence of increased effectiveness
in community economic development relative to the comparison cases.

Assessing Some of the Benefits and Costs of Structural Consolidation

The probability of increased government efficiency is often lowered by the compromising, politi-
cal nature of consolidation campaigns for small and large, rural and urban consolidations (Leland
& Thurmaier, 2010). To neutralize powerful voting blocs and opposition of current elected offi-
cials, proponents often have to sacrifice some of the easiest ways to economize. Thus, proponents

34S American Review of Public Administration 44(4S)

often promise not to decrease the number of elected officials. If a city has 8 and a county has 5,
the newly elected board will most likely contain 13 (or in some cases more) elected officials as
opposed to fewer. If there is an elected sheriff, this position remains elected and does not become
appointed. Proponents may also promise no layoffs of city and county employees and that sav-
ings will accumulate over the long run, from attrition to avoid this natural source of opposition to
consolidation. This assumes that vacant positions will not be filled; however, these positions can
and often are reallocated to other uses, presumably to make government more effective or to
more efficiently allocate resources. Salaries and benefits often have to be “leveled-up.” If city
employees make 25% more than county employees, county employees’ salaries are typically
increased as opposed to decreasing the higher city salaries. If the city has 11 holidays and the
county has 13, the city employees will typically get the two additional holidays when the govern-
ments are merged to avoid employee opposition. Adding holidays, improving salaries, and guar-
anteeing that no one will lose their job does not immediately translate into a reduction in local
government operating costs. Instead, costs are likely to rise. But the promise to voters is usually
to economize (i.e., reduce spending and taxes), not to more efficiently allocate the government’s
resources (i.e., improve allocative efficiency).

Opportunities to economize are also undermined when consolidation proponents need to
promise to raise salaries in comparable positions to attain equity; the alternative of lowering sala-
ries is not generally up for discussion (Leland & Thurmaier, 2010). For example, proponents
typically would not argue that they will lower the salaries of city police officers to the level of the
county sheriff’s officers.

Second, promised economies of scale in service delivery (e.g., water, sanitation, policing) can
be dwarfed by the new capital investments to raise rural service levels. While debt financing can
obviate the need for large, immediate capital spending, the debt still must be repaid with higher
revenues, and for some time. In small jurisdictions, such as in Lynchburg–Moore, Tennessee,
where debt financing is not as easy as in larger jurisdictions, the spike in spending related to new
fire engines, new police cars, and uniforms can swamp the expected economies of scale quickly
(Carroll, Wagers, & Wiggins, 2010).

Although this was not an issue in consolidations prior to the 1960s, today’s efforts to merge
governments can expect to spend more on merging information technology (IT) systems than any
hypothesized savings that might come from fewer IT staff in the short run. Savings from merging
systems are far from obvious, quite the contrary. Organizations have different equipment, forms,
telecommunication systems, and so forth.

Finally, the presumed savings from blending finance and budgeting administrations are often
elusive. The administrative service functions in a city and a county do not overlap much. The
county’s finance department is largely oriented toward collecting taxes on behalf of the constitu-
ent governments and the state, involving property assessments and billings that the cities do not
perform. In addition, the expanded social service and other state-mandated functions of county
government require attention at the budget office level that is not required in a city budget office
(Leland & Thurmaier, 2010).

Functional Consolidation

The longstanding argument that consolidation will increase local government efficiency perpetu-
ates the regionalism versus fragmentation debate (Marando, 1968; Ostrom, Tiebout, & Warren
1961; Savitch & Vogel, 1996; Stephens & Wikstrom, 2000). While the regionalists’ perspective
advocates consolidation to reduce governmental fragmentation and take advantage of economies
of scale (Orfield, 1998; Peirce, Johnson, & Hall, 1993; Rusk, 1995), public choice theorists argue
that this approach will fail to achieve any efficiency with regard to the use of scarce resources.
Indeed, from the public choice perspective, single-unit governments are more likely to behave as

Leland and Thurmaier 35S

monopolists and reduce the quality of services while prices (taxes) rise (Bish, 1971; Bish &
Ostrom, 1973; Tiebout, 1956).

Functional consolidation is a middle-ground resolution of the efficiency and effectiveness
debate. If the goals of regionalists include more effective and more efficient service delivery,
allocating resources more strategically across multiple jurisdictions can accomplish both of those
goals, without reducing the political efficiency that is prized by Tiebout and his intellectual heirs.
There is much written in the popular press in the first decade of the 21st century about how local
governments can no longer afford to “go it alone” and they need to share service delivery to
economize. But systematic research suggests that local governments are unlikely to be forced
into service consolidation because of the economic climate, nor for that matter because of state
legislative pressure.

In fact, local governments have been sharing service responsibilities for many decades through
interlocal agreements (ILAs), and the intergovernmental relations literature has established the
extent of local governments’ participation in intergovernmental service delivery (Agranoff &
McGuire, 2003; Agranoff & Pattakos, 1985; Bartle & Swayze, 1997; Coalition to Improve
Management in State and Local Government, 1992; Friesema, 1971; Henderson, 1984; Jones,
1942; Meek, Schildt, & Witt, 2002; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Pagano, 1999; Shanahan, 1991;
Studenski, 1930; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002; Zimmerman, 1974a, 1974b, 1976; U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1985; Wikstrom, 2002; Wood, 2006). ILAs range
from informal agreements to lend/borrow equipment to public safety mutual aid agreements to
consolidation and joint management of specific public services. Unfortunately, the theoretical
foundation for ILAs and functional consolidation is somewhat lacking. Two promising options
that have been recently applied to ILAs include social network theory and institutional collective
action (ICA) theory.

Scholars who use social network theory identify social networks as the infrastructure by which
administrators and elected officials develop notions of mutual interest, interpersonal and inter-
organizational trust, and norms of reciprocity that lead to innovative collaborations to deliver
public services more effectively and efficiently (Chen & Thurmaier, 2009; Karrupusamy, 2012;
LeRoux & Carr 2007; LeRoux et al., 2010; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002; Zeemering, 2008). Chen
and Thurmaier (2009), for example, find that the most common reasons for the creation of agree-
ments is that public officials believe that an ILA will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of
a public service, with the fiscal condition of the local government cited not nearly as often. This
suggests that management considerations are the most important impetus for ILA participation,
not fiscal crisis. They also find that equitable sharing of benefits is important for the successful
implementation of interlocal agreements, and norms of reciprocity that emanate from underlying
social networks underpin effective agreements.

Scholars who use ICA theory focus attention on the transaction costs inherent in reaching
agreements between two or more political actors and they seek to identify the factors that over-
come these barriers (e.g., Brierly, 2004; Brown & Potoski, 2003; Feiock, 2007). Carr, LeRoux,
and Shrestha (2009) blend the social network and institutional collective action approaches in a
study of Michigan communities that finds that some types of networks created by institutions
increase the likelihood that local governments will rely on intergovernmental service arrange-
ments, finding that that service production decisions are conditioned by the communication net-
works created through institutional linkages in addition to the transaction characteristics of
services.

Assessing Consolidation as a Public Administration Reform

When we are talking about consolidation of local governments, we are really engaged in a debate
about the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization to enhance the core values of public

36S American Review of Public Administration 44(4S)

administration, particularly local government management: equity, efficiency, effectiveness, and
accountability (Leland & Thurmaier, 2000; Savitch & Vogel, 2004b). Regionalism is a reform
designed to meet these goals. So as a regional reform, how does political consolidation compare
with functional consolidation to enhance these values?

Equity

Regional growth management still remains a key target of the social justice movement in
America. According to several scholars, a reduction in segregation via consolidation will allevi-
ate service and income disparities and ultimately produce improved equity (Barnes & Ledebur,
1998; Downs, 1994; Lowery, 1998; and Rusk, 1994, 1995, 2000). …