Chapter12-14.pdf

CHAPTER OBJECTIVES

John Stuart Mill and Utilitarianism

12.1 THE PHILOSOPHER!REFORMER
• Appreciate that Mill was an empiricist philosopher dedicated to seeing that his

liberal and utilitarian ideals be used for the betterment of society. He became
one of the greatest social reformers of his day, advocating individual liberty,
freedom of expression, social tolerance, aid to the poor, the abolition of slav-
ery, humane treatment of prisoners, and women’s rights.

• Know that after su”ering a mental breakdown at age twenty, Mill recovered,
having gained a new perspective on his life and on his previous way of think-
ing. He remained a utilitarian, but he left behind many of the less desirable
features of Jeremy Bentham’s theory.

• Appreciate that Mill earned a prestigious place in the pantheon of respected
philosophers for his work in epistemology, deductive and inductive logic, po-
litical thought, and ethics. Among other works, he wrote System of Logic (1843),
On Liberty (1860), and Utilitarianism (1861).

12.2 MILL’S UTILITARIANISM
• Understand that utilitarians judge the morality of conduct by a single stan-

dard, the principle of utility: right actions are those that result in greater overall
well-being (or utility) for the people involved than any other possible actions.

• Explain the two main forms of utilitarianism and be able to apply them to
sample cases.

• Know that the classic version of utilitarianism, devised by Bentham and given
more plausibility by Mill, is hedonistic in that the utility to be maximized is
pleasure, broadly termed happiness, the only intrinsic good.

• Explain how Mill and Bentham di”er in their conceptions of happiness, and
understand why Mill says, “It is better to be a human being dissatis#ed than a
pig satis#ed; better to be Socrates dissatis#ed than a fool satis#ed.”

• Understand classic utilitarianism’s emphasis on impartiality, the maximiza-
tion of total net happiness, and the method for determining the quality of
happiness.

CHAPTER 12

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The Philosopher-Reformer 287

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12.3 CRITIQUES OF THE THEORY
• Understand the concept of our considered moral judgments and how critics

use it to suggest that utilitarianism is a $awed theory.
• Know how utilitarians have replied to such criticism.

As we’ve seen (Chapter 11), in deontological moral theories, the rightness or
wrongness of an action is based on its nature, not on the consequences that
follow from it. But consequentialist theories say the e!ects of an action are all
that matter; our only duty is to ensure that the e!ects are a maximization of the
good. “e good is whatever has intrinsic value—whatever is valuable for its own
sake—which can include such things as pleasure, happiness, virtue, knowledge,
autonomy, and the satisfaction of desires. In consequentialist ethics, then, the ends
(the results) justify the means (the actions). Utilitarianism is the foremost theory
of this kind, built on the notion that the only thing of intrinsic value is well-
being, governed by the proposition that the rightness or wrongness of an action
is to be judged by its impact on the people involved. John Stuart Mill (1806–
1873) is the theory’s greatest champion, the sharpest thinker to explain it, and the
most compelling example (after Bentham) of a utilitarian applying the ideal creed
to reality.

12.1 THE PHILOSOPHER!REFORMER

Mill was an unusual blend—an empiricist philosopher dedicated to the practical
endeavor of seeing that his liberal and utilitarian ideas were used for the betterment
of society. He was born in London and given a rigorous education by his father,
James Mill, a philosopher in his own right. James was a strong proponent of the
utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (English philosopher and intellectual father of
the theory), and he was determined to raise John Stuart according to utilitarian
principles. John Stuart turned out to be an extremely precocious and bright stu-
dent, beginning the study of Greek at age three and Plato and Latin at eight. In his
teens, he dutifully absorbed his father’s philosophical and political views, worked
for the East India Company, and went abroad to learn French and study chemistry
and mathematics.

At age twenty, his life took an unexpected turn. He su!ered a mental break-
down and fell into a dark depression, a condition that he later said was due to
his strict upbringing and exacting education. After a few months, he recovered,
having gained a new perspective on his life and on his previous way of thinking. He

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remained a utilitarian, but he left behind many of the less desir-
able features of Bentham’s theory. He developed a deep friendship
with the feminist Harriet Taylor, whom he married years later
after her husband died. She had a profound e!ect on his view of
the world and was a major influence on the ideas he expressed in
!e Subjection of Women (1869).

Mill went on to earn a prestigious place in the pantheon of
respected philosophers for his work in epistemology, deductive and
inductive logic, political thought, and ethics. Among other works,
he wrote System of Logic (1843), On Liberty (1860), and Utilitarian-
ism (1861).

He became one of the greatest social reformers of his day,
advocating individual liberty, freedom of expression, social tol-
erance, aid to the poor, the abolition of slavery, humane treat-
ment of prisoners, and women’s rights. Such views were radical
notions at the time, clashing violently with social forces that had
little patience for talk of personal freedom, rights, and concern for
the oppressed.

12.2 MILL’S UTILITARIANISM

Utilitarians judge the morality of conduct by a single standard,
the principle of utility: right actions are those that result in greater overall well-being
(or utility) for the people involved than any other possible actions. We are duty
bound to maximize the utility of everyone a!ected, regardless of the contrary urg-
ings of moral rules or unbending moral principles. In some moral theories (Kant’s,
for example), moral rules are absolute, allowing no exceptions even in exceptional
cases. But in utilitarianism, there are no absolute prohibitions or mandates (except
for the principle of utility itself ). “ere is only the goal of maximizing well-being.
“us utilitarianism is not bothered by unusual circumstances, nor is it hobbled by
conflicting moral principles or rules that demand a uniform response to extraordi-
nary situations.

In applying the utilitarian moral standard, some moral philosophers concen-
trate on specific acts and some on rules covering kinds of acts. “e former approach
is called act-utilitarianism, the idea that the rightness of actions depends solely
on the overall well-being produced by individual actions. An act is right if in a par-
ticular situation it produces a greater balance of well-being over su!ering than any
alternative acts; determining rightness is a matter of weighing the e!ects of each
possible act. “e latter approach, known as rule-utilitarianism, avoids judging
rightness by specific acts and focuses instead on rules governing categories of acts. It
says a right action is one that conforms to a rule that, if followed consistently, would
create for everyone involved the most beneficial balance of well-being over su!ering.
We are to adhere to the rules because, in the long run, they maximize well-being

“”ere are in nature
neither rewards nor
punishments, there are
consequences.”

—Robert Ingersoll

act-utilitarianism “e
idea that the rightness
of actions depends solely
on the overall well-being
produced by individual
actions.

rule-utilitarianism “e
doctrine that a right
action is one that con-
forms to a rule that, if
followed consistently,
would create for everyone
involved the most benefi-
cial balance of well-being
over su!ering.

Figure 12.1 John Stuart Mill (1806–1873).

Mill’s Utilitarianism 289

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for everyone considered—even though a given act may produce bad e!ects in a
particular situation.

Consider how these two forms of utilitarianism could apply to the moral issue
of euthanasia, or mercy killing, the taking of someone’s life for his or her own sake.
Suppose a woman is terminally ill and su!ering horrible, inescapable pain, and she
asks to be put out of her misery. An act-utilitarian might conclude that euthanasia
would be the right course of action because it would result in the least amount of
su!ering for everyone concerned. Allowing the current situation to continue would
cause enormous pain and anguish—the woman’s own physical agony, the misery of
her distraught family, and the distress and frustration of the physician and nurses
who can do little more than stand by as she withers away. Administering a lethal
injection to her, however, would immediately end her pain and prevent future suf-
fering. Her family would grieve for her but would at least find some relief—and
perhaps peace—in knowing that her torture was over. “e medical sta! would prob-
ably also be relieved for the same reason. “ere would, of course, also be possible
negative consequences to take into account. In administering the lethal injection,
her physician would be risking both professional censure and criminal prosecution.
If his actions were to become public, people might begin to mistrust physicians who
treat severely impaired children, undermining the whole medical profession. Perhaps
the physician’s action would lead to a general devaluing of the lives of disabled or
elderly people everywhere. “ese dire consequences, however, would probably not
be very likely if the physician acted discreetly. On balance, the act-utilitarian might
say, greater net well-being (positive amounts of well-being minus negative influences
on well-being) would result from the mercy killing, which would therefore be the
morally right course.

On the other hand, a rule-utilitarian might insist that more net well-being would
be produced by consistently following a rule that disallowed euthanasia. “e argu-
ment would be that permitting mercy killings would have terrible consequences
overall—increases in involuntary euthanasia (mercy killing without the patient’s
consent), erosion of respect for the medical profession, and a weakening of society’s
abhorrence of homicide.

Notice that in either kind of utilitarianism, getting direct answers to a di#cult
moral problem is straightforward. “e facts of the case may be di#cult to ascertain,
but the procedure for discerning the morally right course of action is theoretically
simple: determine which action best maximizes well-being. Such simplicity makes
utilitarianism an appealing theory, especially when compared to others that require
the use of abstract principles or elusive moral concepts.

“e classic version of utilitarianism was devised by Bentham (1748–1832) and
given more detail and plausibility by Mill. Classic utilitarianism is hedonistic in that
the utility to be maximized is pleasure, broadly termed happiness, the only intrinsic
good. A right action produces more net happiness (amounts of happiness minus
unhappiness) than any alternative action, everyone considered.

Bentham and Mill had di!erent ideas about what happiness entailed, as do
many philosophers today. Bentham thinks that happiness is one-dimensional: it is

1. How might a deonto-
logical theorist judge a
case of euthanasia? Do
you think this approach
is better than the utilitar-
ian’s? Why or why not?

“I have learned to seek my
happiness by limiting my
desires, rather than in at-
tempting to satisfy them.”

—John Stuart Mill

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pleasure, pure and simple, something that varies only in the amount that an agent
can experience. On this scheme, it seems that the moral ideal would be to experi-
ence maximum amounts of pleasure, as does the glutton or the debauchee. But Mill
thinks that pleasures can vary in quality as well as quantity. For him, there are lower
and higher pleasures—the lower and inferior ones indulged in by the glutton and his
ilk and the higher and more satisfying ones found in such experiences as the search
for knowledge and the appreciation of art and music. Mill famously sums up this
contrast by saying, “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied;
better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”1

2. Which view of the
nature of happiness
seems more plausible to
you—Bentham’s or Mill’s?
Why?

Jeremy Bentham
Few in the English-speaking world have had as much influence
on law, ethics, and social policy as Jeremy Bentham (1748–
1832). Born in London and educated at Oxford, he became a
philosopher preoccupied early in his life with the injustice and
harm that he thought was being perpetrated by the law and mores
of the times. He spent most of his career developing his ideas about
ethics and society and trying to apply them to the world around
him. His answer to the problems he saw was a moral theory he
called utilitarianism, spelled out in his Introduction to the Prin-
ciples of Morals and Legislation (1789).

For Bentham, the result of applying misguided ideas and
half-baked theories to society was a vast amount of human
su!ering. He complained that in traditional law and morality,
harmless actions were condemned and harmful actions were promoted. Freedom of speech
and freedom of action were constrained or eliminated altogether in the name of traditional,
religious, or subjective morals. Worst of all, as Bentham saw it, policies and laws were laid
down without any consideration of human happiness.

His utilitarianism, on the other hand, made human happiness the crux and measure
of a good society. His famous utilitarian formula sums it up: the goal of actions should
be the greatest happiness for the greatest number. With this theoretical underpinning,
Bentham campaigned for equal rights for women, the reform of prisons, the elimination
of imprisonment for debtors, more democratic government, the relaxation of laws against
certain kinds of sexual behavior, and the abolition of what he called moral fictions such as
“natural rights.”

Bentham died in 1832, but he is still hanging around University College in London,
which he helped found. Actually it’s his embalmed body that is still on display there—fully
clothed, sporting a wax model of his head, looking as if he were ready to make an important
point. “is strange state of a!airs was mandated in his will. Apparently Bentham had an
odd sense of humor.

PORTR AIT

Figure 12.2 Not just any
mummy: the embalmed
corpse of Jeremy Bentham
at University College,
London.

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Like all forms of utilitarianism, the classic formulation demands a strong sense
of impartiality. When promoting happiness, we must not only take into account
the happiness of everyone a!ected, but also give everyone’s needs or interests equal
weight. Mill explains:

“is moral even-handedness is an attractive feature of utilitarianism. As we have
seen, impartiality is a fundamental characteristic of morality itself. Despite our dif-
ferences in social status, race, gender, religion, and wealth, we are all equal before the
moral law. Early utilitarians such as Bentham and Mill took moral equality seriously,
crusading for social changes that were based on strict adherence to the impartiality
principle.

In classic utilitarianism, the emphasis is on maximizing the total quantity of
net happiness, not ensuring that it is rationed in any particular amounts among the
people involved. “is means that an action resulting in one thousand units of hap-
piness for ten people is better than an action yielding only nine hundred units of
happiness for those same ten people—regardless of how the units of happiness are
distributed among them. Classic utilitarians do want to allocate the total amount of
happiness among as many people as possible (thus their motto, “the greatest happi-
ness for the greatest number”). But maximizing total happiness is the fundamental
concern whether everyone gets an equal portion or one person gets the lion’s share.

“is is how Mill defends his brand of utilitarianism:

“Happiness is a pig’s
philosophy.”

—Friedrich Nietzsche

John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism

[The] happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right conduct, is not the
agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that
of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevo-
lent spectator.2

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Prin-
ciple, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and
the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view
of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular,
what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an
open question. But these supplementary explanations do not a”ect the theory of life on
which this theory of morality is grounded—namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain,
are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in
the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in them-
selves, or as a means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.

Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most
estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it)

John Stuart Mill:
Utilitarianism

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no higher end than pleasure—no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit—they desig-
nate as utterly mean and groveling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers
of Epicurus were), at a very early period, contemptuously likened; and modern holders of the
doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German,
French, and English assailants.

When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not they, but their
accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes
human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. If
this supposition were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer
an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and
to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the

DETAILS

John Stuart Mill, “What Utilitarianism Is,” Utilitarianism (1861).

Utilitarianism and the Golden Rule
Probably much to the dismay of his religious critics, John Stuart Mill defended his radical
doctrine of utilitarianism by arguing that it was entirely consistent with a fundamental
Christian teaching:

In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics
of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one’s neighbour as oneself,
constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making
the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social
arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be
called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with
the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have
so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish
in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own
happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and
the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the
universal happiness prescribes: so that not only he may be unable to conceive the
possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to
the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good
may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the senti-
ments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human
being’s sentient existence.

Do you think utilitarianism is really equivalent to the Golden Rule? If so, why? If not,
what are the chief di”erences between the two?

John Stuart Mill:
Utilitarianism

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other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely
because a beast’s pleasures do not satisfy a human being’s conception of happiness.
Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once
made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include
their grati#cation. I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means
faultless in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do
this in any su%cient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be in-
cluded. But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the plea-
sures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much
higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however,
that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily plea-
sures chie$y in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former—that is, in
their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points
utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may
be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle
of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more
valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is
considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend
on quantity alone.

If I am asked, what I mean by di”erence of quality in pleasures, or what makes one
pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in
amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one which all or
almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feel-
ing of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is,
by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that
they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a great amount of discontent,
and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable
of, we are justi#ed in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far
outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.

Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and
equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to
the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would
consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance
of a beast’s pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed
person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be sel#sh and
base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better
satis#ed with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess
more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in
common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so ex-
treme, that to escape from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however
undesirable in their own eyes. A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy,
is capable probably of more acute su”ering, and certainly accessible to it at more points,
than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink
into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what explanation we
please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscrimi-
nately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind
are capable; we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to
which was with the Stoics one of the most e”ective means for the inculcation of it; to the
love of power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and

3. Is the utilitarian view
of morality based on the
promotion of happiness
demeaning? Is there more
to life than the pursuit
of&happiness (as Mill
de#nes it)?

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contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human
beings possess in one form or another, and in some, though by no means in exact, propor-
tion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in
whom it is strong, that nothing which con$icts with it could be, otherwise than momen-
tarily, an object of desire to them. Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a
sacri#ce of happiness—that the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not
happier than the inferior—confounds the two very di”erent ideas, of happiness, and con-
tent. It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the great-
est chance of having them fully satis#ed; and a highly endowed being will always feel that
any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can
learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bearable; and they will not make him envy
the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at
all the good which those imperfections qualify. It is better to be a human being dissatis#ed
than a pig satis#ed; better to be Socrates dissatis#ed than a fool satis#ed. And if the fool, or
the pig, are of a di”erent opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the ques-
tion. The other party to the comparison knows both sides. . . .

From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal.
On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of
existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its
consequences, the judgment of those who are quali#ed by knowledge of both, or, if they
di”er, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as #nal. And there needs to be
the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there
is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity. What means are
there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable
sensations, except the general su”rage of those who are familiar with both? Neither pains
nor pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is
there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular
pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those feel-
ings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be prefera-
ble in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature,
disjoined from the higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the
same regard.

I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of
Utility or Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no
means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that
standard is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness
altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the hap-
pier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that
the world in general is immensely a gainer …